Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, e.g., those who struggle with contingent reasoning [Li, 2015] . However, it has been shown to impose some limitations, e.g., no OSP mechanism can return a stable matching [Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2015] .
Introduction
Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD) is by now an established research area in computer science that aims at conceiving algorithms resistant to selfish manipulations. As the number of parties (a.k.a., agents) involved in the computation increases, there is, in fact, the need to realign their individual interests with the designer's. Truthfulness is the chief concept to achieve that: in a truthful mechanism, no selfish and rational agent has an interest to misguide the mechanism. A valid question of recent interest is, however, how easy it is for the selfish agents to understand that it is useless (and possibly costly) to strategize against the truthful mechanism at hand.
Recent research has come up with different approaches to deal with this question. Some authors [Sandholm and Gilpin, 2003 , Chawla et al., 2010 , Babaioff et al., 2014 , Adamczyk et al., 2015 suggest to focus on "simple" mechanisms; e.g., in posted-price mechanisms one's own bid is immaterial for the price paid to get some goods of interest -this should immediately suggest that trying to play the mechanism is worthless no matter the cognitive abilities of the agents. However, in such a body of work, this property remains unsatisfactorily vague. An orthogonal approach is that of verifiably truthful mechanisms [Brânzei and Procaccia, 2015] , wherein agents can run some algorithm to effectively check that the mechanism is incentive compatible. Nevertheless, these verification algorithms can run for long (i.e., time exponential in the input size) and are so far known only for quite limited scenarios. Importantly, moreover, they seem to transfer the question from the mechanism itself to the verification algorithm.
Our Contribution
We investigate the power of OSP mechanisms in more detail from a theoretical computer science perspective. In particular, we want to understand the quality of approximate solutions that can be output by OSP mechanisms. To answer this question, we focus on two fundamental optimization problems, machine scheduling [Archer and Tardos, 2001 ] and facility location [Moulin, 1980] , arguably (among) the paradigmatic problems in AMD.
For the former problem, we want to compute a schedule of jobs on selfish related machines (i.e., machines with job-independent speeds) so to minimize the makespan. For this singledimensional problem, it is known that a truthful PTAS is possible [Christodoulou and Kovács, 2013] . In contrast, we show that there is no better than 2-approximate OSP mechanism for this problem independently from the running time of the mechanism.
For the facility location problem, we want to determine the location of a facility on the real line given the preferred locations of n agents. The objective is to minimize the social cost, defined as the sum over the individual agents of the distances between their preferred location and the facility's. Moulin [1980] proves that the optimal mechanism, that places the facility on the median of the reported locations, is truthful without money (i.e., the mechanism does not pay or charge the agents). OSP mechanisms without money turn out to be much weaker than that. We prove in fact a tight bound of n − 1. Interestingly, this bound can be shown also for mechanisms that use money, thus showing that transfers are not useful at all to enforce OSP. The proof of this fact uses a novel lower bounding technique for OSP mechanisms wherein the bidding domain (or, equivalently the strategy set) of the lying agent does not necessarily have size two (whereas, to the best of our knowledge, all previous impossibility results rely on this assumption); we in fact show that it is enough to identify two particular values in the bidding domain for our argument to work no matter the size of the domain.
However, a surprising connection of OSP mechanisms with a novel mechanism design paradigm -called monitoring -allows us to prove strong positive results. Building upon the notion of mechanisms with verification [Nisan and Ronen, 2001 , Ventre, 2014 , Penna and Ventre, 2014 , Kovács et al. [2015] introduce the idea that a mechanism can check the declarations of the agents at running time and guarantee that those who overreported their costs end up paying the exaggerated costs. This can be enforced whenever costs can be easily measured and certified. For example, a mechanism can force a machine that in her declaration has augmented her running time to work that long by keeping her idle for the difference between real and reported running time.
We first prove that, no matter the algorithm at hand, there exists an OSP mechanism with monitoring that always compensates the agents their costs. This first-price mechanism, introduced in the context of mechanisms with monitoring by Serafino et al. [2017] , yields a couple of interesting observations in the context of OSP mechanisms. Firstly, it is the first direct-revelation OSP mechanism. As such it does not need any assumption on the agents' bidding domain nor to repeatdly query/interact with the agents. We remark that the known constructions of Li [2015] typically need finite domains (or, slightly more generally, domains admitting a finite partition). Secondly, the mechanism uses the algorithm at hand as a black box thus reconciling approximation and obvious strategyproofness. This is relavant because, even for truthful mechanism, it is known that, without monitoring, black box reduction to a non-truthful algorithm may not exist [Dobzinski and Vondrák, 2012] . This theorem can then be applied to both our problems of interest, and prove the existence of optimal OSP mechanisms with monitoring. Clearly, the optimal mechanism for machine scheduling runs in exponential time; a PTAS that is OSP can however be obtained by plugging in the appropriate approximation algorithm.
Nevertheless, as noted in related literature [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2013] , paying the agents in facility location problems might not be feasible in certain contexts. We therefore look at mechanisms that charge agents to use the facilities (e.g., via a subscription fee); note that, as stated above, transfers ought to be used for good approximations. We design the interval mechanism for facility location that is optimal, OSP with monitoring and charges (rather than paying) the agents. This construction adapts the first-price mechanism in [Serafino et al., 2017] to guarantee obvious strategyproofness even in absence of funds to pay the agents. We further show that this simple adaptation can be cleverly modified to guarantee that agents are charged as little as possible; we in fact prove that in general there is no OSP mechanism that is more economical than that.
Our results for facility location draw an interesting parallel between OSP and truthful mechanisms. On one hand, our bounds for OSP mechanisms without money are in stark contrast with the case of strategyproof mechanisms where the optimum is known to be truthful [Moulin, 1980] . On the other hand, our results for OSP mechanisms can be likened to truthful mechanisms for K-facility location, K ≥ 2, where there is a linear gap between truthful approximations with and without money Tennenholtz, 2013, Fotakis and Tzamos, 2014] (incidentally, there are hints that the gap remains linear also for relaxed notions of truthfulness without money [Ferraioli et al., 2016] ) -in the case of OSP mechanisms the price to pay to close the gap is not only money, but also monitoring.
Preliminaries
Mechanisms and Strategyproofness. In this work we consider a classical mechanism design setting, in which we have a set of outcomes O and n selfish agents. Each agent i has a type t i ∈ D i , where D i is defined as the domain of i. The type t i is private knowledge of agent i. Moreover, each selfish agent i has a cost function c i :
is the cost paid by agent i to implement X when her type is t i .
A mechanism consists of a protocol whose goal is to determine an outcome X ∈ O. To this aim, the mechanism is allowed to interact with agents. During this interaction, agent i is observed to take actions (e.g., saying yes/no); these actions may depend on her presumed type b i ∈ D i that can be different from the real type t i (e.g., saying yes could "signal" that the presumed type has some properties that b i alone might enjoy). We say that agent i takes actions according to b i to stress this. For a mechanism M, we let M(b) denote the outcome returned by the mechanism when agents take actions according to their presumed types b = (b 1 , . . . , b n ). Usually, this outcome is given by a pair (f, p), where f = f (b) (termed social choice function or, simply, algorithm) maps the actions taken by the agents according to b to a feasible solution for the problem at the hand (e.g., an allocation of jobs to machines that enjoys particular properties), and p = p(b) = (p 1 (b), . . . , p n (b)) ∈ R n maps the actions taken by the agents according to b to payments from the mechanism to each agent i. Note that the p i 's can be positive (meaning that the mechanism will pay the agents) or negative (meaning that the agents will pay the mechanism).
A mechanisms is said without money if p i (b) = 0 for every agent i and every profile b ∈ D = D 1 × · · · × D n . Our definitions below do naturally extend to this case by considering null payments.
A mechanism M is strategy-proof if for every i, every
, where t i is the true type of i. That is, in a strategy-proof mechanism the actions taken according to the true type are dominant for each agent.
Moreover, a mechanism M is said to satisfy voluntary participation if for every i and every
Obvious Strategyproofness. Let us now formally define the concept of obviously strategyproof mechanism. This concept has been introduced in [Li, 2015] . The original definition turns out to be very general and, consequently, quite complex. For this reason, in this work we follow Ashlagi and Gonczarowski [2015] and rephrase this definition for our setting of interest. Note that we focus on deterministic mechanisms only.
We begin by formally modeling how a mechanism works and subsequently give some intuition behind the mathematical definition. Specifically, we have that an extensive-form mechanism M is defined by a directed tree T = (V, E) such that:
• every leaf ℓ of the tree is labeled by a possible outcome X(ℓ) ∈ O of the mechanism;
• every internal vertex u ∈ V is labeled by a subset S(u) ⊆ [n] of agents;
• every edge e = (u, v) ∈ E is labeled by a subset T (e) ⊆ D of type profiles such that:
-the subsets of profiles that label the edges outgoing from the same vertex u are disjoint, i.e., for every triple of vertices
-the union of the subsets of profiles that label the edges outgoing from a non-root vertex u is equal to the subset of profiles that label the edge going in u, i.e.,
, where φ(u) is the parent of u in T ; -the union of the subsets of profiles that label the edges outgoing from the root vertex r is equal to the set of all profiles, i.e., v : (r,v)∈E T (r, v) = D;
-for every u, v such that (u, v) ∈ E and for every two profiles b,
Roughly speaking, the tree represents the steps of the execution of the mechanism. As long as the current visited vertex u is not a leaf, the mechanism concurrently interacts with agents in S(u). Different edges outgoing from vertex u are used for modeling the different actions that agents can take during this interaction with the mechanism. In particular, each possible action is assigned to an edge outgoing from u. As suggested above, the action that agent i takes may depend on her presumed type b i ∈ D i . That is, different presumed types may correspond to taking different actions, and thus to different edges. The label T (e) on edge e = (u, v) then lists the type profiles that enable agents in S(u) to take those actions that have been assigned to e. In other words, when the agents take the actions assigned to edge e, then the mechanism (and the other agents) can infer that the type profile must be contained in T (e). The constraints on the edges' label can be then explained as follows: first we can safely assume that different actions must correspond to different type profiles (indeed, if two different actions are enabled by the same profiles we can consider them as a single action); second, we can safely assume that each action must correspond to at least one type profile that has not been excluded yet by actions taken before node u was visited (otherwise, we could have excluded this type profile earlier); third, we have that the action taken by agents in S(u) can only inform about types of agents in S(u) and not about the type of the remaining agents (that are completely unknown to agents in S(u)). The execution ends when we reach a leaf ℓ of the tree. In this case, the mechanism returns the outcome that labels ℓ.
Observe that, according to the definition above, for every profile b there is only one leaf ℓ = ℓ(b) such that b belongs to T (φ(ℓ), ℓ). For this reason we say that M(b) = X(ℓ). Moreover, for every type profile b and every node u ∈ V , we say that b is compatible
We are now ready to define obvious strategyproofness. An extensive-form mechanism M is obviously strategy-proof (OSP) if for every agent i, for every vertex u such that i ∈ S(u), for every b −i , b ′ −i , and for every
Roughly speaking, an obvious strategy-proof mechanism requires that, at each time step agent i is asked to take a decision that depends on her type, the worst cost that she can pay if at this time step she behaves according to her true type is at least the same as the best cost achievable by behaving as she had a different type.
Hence, if a mechanism is obviously strategy-proof, then it is also strategy-proof. Indeed, the latter requires that truthful behavior is a dominant strategy when agents know the entire type profile, whereas the former requires that it continues to be a dominant strategy even if agents have only a partial knowledge of profiles 1 , limited to what they observed in the mechanism up to the time they are called to take their choices.
We say that an extensive-form mechanism is trivial if for every vertex u ∈ V and for every two type profiles b, b ′ , it holds that b and b ′ do not diverge at u. That is, a mechanism is trivial if it never requires that agents take actions that depend on their type. Observe that if a mechanism M is not trivial, then every path from the root to one leaf goes through a vertex u ⋆ such that there are two type profiles b, b ′ that diverge at u ⋆ . Since b = b ′ , then there exists at least one agent i ⋆ such that
Moreover, by our definition of extensive-form mechanism, it must be the case that i ⋆ ∈ S(u ⋆ ). For this reason, we call i ⋆ as the divergent agent for the mechanism M. Note that the divergent agent takes a decision that depends on her own type before any other agents revealed any information about their own type. For this reason, in order to prove that a mechanism is not obviously strategy-proof, it is sufficient to show that there are two type profiles b, b ′ with b i ⋆ = b ′ i ⋆ such that they diverge at u ⋆ , and
Let us state two further properties of obvious strategyproofness, that turn out to be very useful in the rest of the paper. First, it is not hard to see that if M is OSP when the type profile is taken from D, then it continues to be OSP even if the types are only allowed to be selected from
Moreover, let us define M ′ obtained from M by pruning the paths involving actions corresponding to types in D \ D ′ . If M is OSP, then also M ′ enjoys this property [Li, 2015] .
Monitoring. Let M(b) denote the outcome returned by mechanism M = (f, p) when agents take actions according to b. Commonly, the cost paid by agent i to implement M(b) is defined as a quasi-linear combination of agent's true cost 2 t i (f (b)) and payment
. This approach disregards the agent's declaration for evaluating her cost.
In mechanisms with monitoring the usual quasi-linear definition is maintained but costs paid by the agents are more strictly tied to their declarations [Kovács et al., 2015] . Specifically, in a mechanism with monitoring M, the bid b i is a lower bound on agent i's cost for f (b i , b −i ), so an agent is allowed to have a real cost higher than b i (f (b)) but not lower. 3 Formally, we have
We next describe two specific problems of interest.
Machine Scheduling. Here, we are given a set of m different jobs to execute and the n agents control related machines. That is, agent i has a job-independent processing time t i per unit of job (equivalently, an execution speed 1/t i that is independent from the actual jobs). The social choice function f must choose a possible schedule f (b) = (f 1 (b), . . . , f n (b)) of jobs to the machines, where f i (b) denotes the job load assigned to machine i when agents take actions according to b. The cost that agent i faces for the schedule f (b) is t i (f (b)) = t i · f i (b). Note that our mechanisms for machine scheduling will always pay the agents.
Monitoring can be readily implemented for this setting. In fact, monitoring means that those agents who have exaggerated their unitary processing time, i.e., they take actions according to b i > t i , can be made to process up to time b i instead of the true processing time t i . For example, we could not allow any other operation in the time interval
We focus on social choice functions f * optimizing the makespan, i.e.,
We say that f is α-approximate if it returns a solution whose cost is a factor α away from the optimum.
Facility Location. In the facility location problem, the type t i of each agent consists of her position on the real line. The social choice function f must choose a position f (b) ∈ R for the facility. The cost that agent i pays for a chosen position
) denotes the distance between t i and the location of the facility computed by f when agents take actions according to b.
We can implement monitoring also in this setting whenever evidences of the distance can be provided (and cannot be counterfeited). In fact, in this context, monitoring means that
Therefore, once the evidence is provided, the mechanism can check whether t i (f (b)) < b i (f (b)) and charge the agent the difference for cheating. 4 We focus on social choice functions f * optimizing the social cost, i.e.,
As above, we say that f is α-approximate if it returns a solution whose cost is at most a factor α away from the optimum.
A General Positive Result
For an algorithm f , define
We call the direct-revelation mechanism (f, p) a first-price mechanism.
Theorem 1. Any direct-revelation first-price mechanism is OSP with monitoring and satisfies voluntary participation.
Proof. In order to prove that M = (f, p) is OSP, consider agent i and let t i be her true type. We next show that for agent i it is always convenient to be truthful, regardless of the decisions taken by other agents. To this aim, let us recall that in a mechanism with monitoring the cost that i pays, given the submitted type profile is b, is
Suppose that i is truthful; then for every b −i , it turns out that
Suppose, instead, that i lies and says
Note that all the cost (in)equalities hold no matter the value of b −i . Thus, in both cases the best cost that i can obtain by adopting a strategy different from the truthful one is not smaller than the worst cost that i can obtain by adopting the truthful strategy, as desired.
It is important to note that in the construction above, we may use every algorithm as a black box. This in particular means that we can turn any optimal (approximation, resp.) algorithm into an optimal (approximate, resp.) OSP mechanism with monitoring (without losses to the approximation guarantee, resp.). Thus, for Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) with additive bidders our mechanism with monitoring beats the lower bound proved by Bade and Gonczarowski [2016] for OSP mechanisms. 5 Just as the weaker notion of verification has been shown to be useful in the context of truthful CAs without money , our result shows that OSP with monitoring matches the best-known (poynomial-time) approximations achieved not only by truthful mechanisms [Krysta et al., 2015 , Lehmann et al., 2002 , but also by general algorithms [Hurkens and Schrijver, 1989, Halldórsson, 1999] .
We also stress that this construction is query optimal, as the interaction with each agent is minimum. It is worthy to observe that such an interaction does not need to be simultaneous (as assumed in practically all the literature on direct-revelation mechanisms) since obvious strategyproofness is maintained even if agents are queried in an adversarially chosen order and know what the bidders preceding them have declared. We will see how to exploit this property to reduce our payments for facility location. Finally, as observed above, we do not require the domain of each agent to be finite.
Machine Scheduling
We now show that, without monitoring, there is no OSP mechanism that satisfies voluntary participation and returns an assignment of jobs to machines whose makespan is at most twice the makespan of the optimal assignment. Interestingly, this is the same lower bound that Nisan and Ronen [2001] proved for the approximation ratio of strategy-proof mechanisms for unrelated machines, i.e., when it is not possible to express the processing time of jobs on machines as a product of jobs' load and machine's unit processing time. We wonder if a more deep relationship exists between OSP mechanisms for scheduling on related machines and strategy-proof mechanisms for scheduling on unrelated machines, and if one can improve the lower bound for the former problem in order to match the best known lower bounds for the latter, i.e., 1 + φ ≈ 2.61 for general mechanisms [Koutsoupias and Vidali, 2007] , and n for anonymous mechanisms [Ashlagi et al., 2012] .
Theorem 2. For every ε > 0, there is no (2 − ε)-approximate mechanism for the machine scheduling problem that is OSP without monitoring and satisfies voluntary participation.
Proof. Let us consider the simple setting in which there are exactly two machines, that we denote with 0 and 1, and two equivalent jobs of unit length. We will denote with t 0 and t 1 the type, i.e., the job processing time, of machine 0 and 1, respectively. Suppose there is a k-approximate, with k < 2, OSP mechanism M that satisfies voluntary participation.
Since the mechanism is k-approximate, then it must be the case that: if t 0 < t 1 2k , then M assigns both jobs to machine 0; if t 0 > 2k · t 1 , then M assigns both jobs to machine 1; if k 2 · t 1 < t 0 < 2 k · t 1 , then M assigns one job to each machine. Moreover, since mechanism M = (f, p) is OSP, then it must be also strategy-proof. Archer and Tardos [2001] proved that a mechanism for the machine scheduling problem is strategyproof and satisfies voluntary participation if and only if (i) the allocation of jobs to machine i ∈ {0, 1} returned by f when the type of the other machine is t 1−i is monotone, i.e., f i (t i , t 1−i ) ≤ f i (t ′ i , t 1−i ) whenever t i > t ′ i ; (ii) the payment that the machine i receives is
In our setting, the monotonicity requirement implies that, for every t 1−i , there are t ′ ∈ t 1−i 2k , k 2 · t 1−i and t ′′ ∈ 2 k · t 1−i , 2k · t 1−i , such that machine i is assigned both jobs if t i < t ′ , only one job if t ′ ≤ t i ≤ t ′′ , and no jobs if
, and p i (t i , t 1−i ) = 0 otherwise. Let us now restrict the domain of the agents to D ′ = {a, b} 2 , with b > k 2 a. Let M ′ be the mechanism obtained by pruning M according to this restriction. As stated above, M ′ must be an OSP mechanism. Moreover, the approximation ratio of M ′ cannot be worse than the approximation ratio of M. Hence, M ′ cannot be trivial (indeed, a trivial mechanism would have approximation ratio worse than k).
Let i be the divergent agent of M ′ . Clearly, a and b are the types in which i diverges. Suppose that t i = a. If i behaves according to t i , then it may be the case that the other agent behaves according type a too. As showed above, in this case machine i receives one job and payment t ′′ ≤ 2ka. Hence, c i (a, M(a, a) ) ≥ a − 2ka. Suppose instead that i behaves as if her type was b. It may be the case that the other agent behaves according type b too. Then, machine i still receives one job and a payment t ′′ ≥ 2 k · b. Hence,
where we used that b > k 2 a. In words, the best cost paid by i if she does not behave according to her true type can be lower than the worst cost she can pay if she behaves according to her true type. Then, the mechanism M ′ is not OSP, contradicting our hypothesis.
Since there is a PTAS for the allocation of jobs to related machines [Hochbaum and Shmoys, 1988] , then we have the following corollary of Theorem 1. 
Corollary 1. There is an OSP mechanism with monitoring that computes the optimal scheduling of jobs to related machines (in exponential time

Facility Location
We now show that, without monitoring, there is no OSP mechanism for the facility location problem with an approximation ratio better than n − 1. To this aim, let us first state the following simple observation.
Observation 1. For every α, β, with α < β, no k-approximate mechanism M = (f, p), with k < n − 1, sets f (x) ≤ α, if x i = α and x j = β for every j = i, and f (y) ≥ β, if y i = β and y j = α for every j = i.
The observation will be proved below in a more general statement.
Theorem 3. For every ε > 0, there is no (n − 1 − ε)-approximate mechanism for the facility location problem that is OSP without monitoring.
Proof. Let M = (f, p) be a (n − 1 − ε)-approximate mechanism that is OSP without monitoring. Let us restrict the domain of every agent to D ′ = {a, a+δ, . . . , b−δ, b}, where δ ≤ ε n−2 · b−a 2 . Let M ′ be the mechanism obtained by pruning M according to this restriction. As stated above, M ′ must be an OSP mechanism. Moreover, the approximation ratio of M ′ cannot be worse than the approximation ratio of M. Hence, M ′ cannot be trivial, otherwise its approximation ratio would be unbounded.
Then, let i be the divergent agent of M ′ . Note that, by definition of divergent agent, there must be two types t i , t ′ i of agent i such that t ′ i = t i + δ and i takes an action in M ′ when her type is t i that is different from the action taken when her type is t ′ i . We denote as c and d the smallest t i and the largest t ′ i , respectively, for which this occurs, i.e., c is the smallest type in D ′ such that i diverges on c and c + δ, and d is the largest type in D ′ such that i diverges on d and d − δ.
Note that either c < b+a
In the rest of the proof we will assume that c < The proof uses two profiles x and y, that are defined as follows:
• x i = c + δ, and x k = c for every k = i,;
• y i = c, and y k = b for every k = i.
We begin by using OSP to relate payments and outcomes of the mechanism M ′ on input x and y. Specifically, we note that if the real location of i is
. Since i diverges on c and c + δ and M ′ is OSP, we have that
. Hence, it follows that
Suppose instead that the real location of i is
As above, since i diverges on c and c + δ and M ′ is OSP, we have that
Therefore, in order to satisfy both (1) and (2), we need that
Using (3) above, we first show that f (x) must be at most c and then that f (y) ≤ c + δ. Finally, we prove how this last fact contradicts the desired approximation ratio.
Let us first show that f (x) ≥ c. Suppose instead that f (x) < c. Since f (x) < c, then the r.h.s. of (3) is δ. As for the l.h.s., we distinguish two cases. If f (y) ≤ c + δ, then, since f (y) > c according to Observation 1, then we have (c
Hence, in both cases we reach a contradiction.
We now show that f (y) ≤ c + δ. Assume by contradiction that f (y) > c + δ. Since f (x) ≥ c, and f (x) < c + δ by Observation 1, we can rewrite (3) as
However, this is impossible since f (x) < c + δ.
Finally, we prove that, given that f (y) ≤ c + δ, then the mechanism is not (n − 1 − ε)-approximate. Indeed, since by Observation 1 f (y) > c, the total cost of mechanism M ′ on input y is
where we used that
2 . However, this is absurd, since M ′ is (n − 1 − ε)-approximate and the optimal mechanism on input y places the facility in b and has total cost b − c.
Next show that if we insist on mechanisms without money, then there is no OSP mechanism that can guarantee an approximation ratio better than n − 1 even when the mechanism can use monitoring.
Theorem 4. For every ε > 0, there is no (n − 1 − ε)-approximate mechanism without money for the facility location problem that is OSP, even with monitoring.
In order to prove Theorem 4, we first need to state the following lemma, that can be seen as a quantitative version of Observation 1. Lemma 1. Consider a type profile b such that b i = x for some i and b j = x − α for every
for every k-approximate mechanism.
Proof. The optimal facility location for the given setting consists in placing the facility in position x − α. The total cost in this case is α.
n , then the total cost is larger than (n − 1)
n−2 , then the total cost is (n − 1)(f − x + α) + x − f = (n − 2)(f − x) + (n − 1)α > kα, thus no k-approximate mechanism can place the facility in f (b).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4.
Suppose there is an OSP mechanism M that is (n − 1 − ε)-approximate. Clearly, the mechanism is non-trivial, otherwise its approximation ratio would be unbounded. Then, let i be the divergent agent of M, and let x i and y i be the types in which i diverges. W.l.o.g., assume that x i > y i . Let λ = 2 (x i − y i ) and α = λ· n−2 ε . Let x i be the truthful position of this agent. If i plays truthfully, then she can face the setting in which the remaining n − 1 agents are in position x i − α. By applying Lemma 1 with k = n − 1 − ε and x = x i , we have that the distance of agent i from the facility must be at least
Suppose that instead i plays as if her real location would be y i . It may be then the case that the remaining n − 1 agents are exactly in the same position. Then, any mechanism with bounded approximation must place the facility in y i = x i − λ 2 . Recall that, with monitoring, the cost of agent i must be taken as the maximum between the distance to the facility either from the real position or from the declared position. In this case, this is given by the former distance and it is λ 2 < λ. Thus, the best cost paid by i by not playing truthfully is lower than the worst cost that she can pay by playing truthfully. Then, the mechanism M is not OSP, contradicting our hypothesis.
The bounds above are tight, since there is a (n − 1)-approximate mechanism without money for the facility location problem that is OSP, even without monitoring. Consider, indeed, the dictatorship mechanism, in which only the dictator i is queried for her position. It is well-known that this mechanism is (n − 1)-approximate. We next observe that it is also OSP. Agent i is the only agent that is involved in a decision and it is always better for her to reveal her real position x i : indeed, in this case the facility will be located exactly in her position and the cost of i will be 0, whereas by declaring a different position x = x i the cost will be |x − x i | > 0.
Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Facility Location
Interestingly, monitoring gives an enormous power in this setting. Indeed, since the optimal facility location is the median among the positions declared by agents, it follows from Theorem 1 that there is an OSP mechanism with monitoring that computes the optimal facility location in polynomial time.
Recall that in this mechanism the agents receive a payment. As noted in the introduction, however, for facility location problem we might need alternative mechanisms in which it is not the designer to pay agents, but the agents to pay the mechanism. Note that this is more natural in settings wherein agents' payments can be easily implemented via subscription fees or delayed access to the facility. We next present such an alternative optimal OSP mechanism.
We are going to assume that we are given some bounds on the agents' potential locations. (Note that in some of the related literature on facility location, agents can declare any location in R.) To simplify the notation, we assume that D i = [a, b] for all agents i. Consider now the following direct-revelation mechanism, that we call interval mechanism:
1. Query agents for their position.
2. Let x be the profile of the collected positions. Then fix the location f (x) of the facility to be the median of x. In case of multiple medians, the facility is located on the leftmost median.
For every agent
It is not hard to see that the interval mechanism simply "shifts" the payments of the mechanism in Theorem 1 to make them of the right sign. In a sense, the theorem below proves that, just like truthfulness, OSP is preserved when these shifts are bid independent.
Theorem 5. The interval mechanism is an optimal mechanism that is OSP with monitoring.
Proof. We will next prove that the mechanism is OSP, and thus each agent has an incentive to declare her real position. Since the mechanism places the facility in the median of these positions, it then turns out to be optimal as well.
In order to prove that it is OSP, recall that in a mechanism with monitoring the cost that i pays is c i (x i , M(y)) = max{d(x i , f (y)), d(y i , f (y))} − p i (y). Consider then agent i and let x i be her real position. If i declares the real position, then her total cost will be b − a. If i declares a different position x ′ i , then there are two cases: if min
Thus, in both cases the best cost that i can obtain by declaring a position different from the real one is not smaller than the worst cost that i can obtain by playing truthfully.
The drawback of the interval mechanism is that the payment that this mechanism charges may be as large as the size of the interval. This opens the question of whether more frugal payment schemes exist -or in other words, how susceptible OSP with monitoring is to payment shifts that are not bid independent.
We will show in Section 5.1.1 that it is indeed possible to slightly optimize the interval mechanism in order to be less expensive for the agents. We further prove that our optimization is optimal as long as we focus on direct-revelation mechanisms. However, even this optimized version still requires that O(n) agents will pay an amount that is about b − a. We will show that this is somewhat unavoidable, even if one considers mechanisms that are not direct-revelation.
The Optimized Interval Mechanism
Consider the following optimized version of the interval mechanism, that we call Optimized Interval Mechanism (OIM):
3. For every agent i ∈ [n], let K i (k i , resp.) be the set (number, resp.) of agents queried before i. Let s = (s 1 , . . . , s k i ) be the profile containing the locations declared by these agents in non-decreasing order. Let ℓ = n 2 + k i − n + 1 and r = n 2 − 1. If ℓ > 1, r < k i and s ℓ−1 = s r+1 , then set p i (x) = 0 for every x = ((s,
Otherwise, we define L i and R i as follows:
Let also define A i and B i as follows:
otherwise.
The idea behind OIM is to exploit the information given by the interactive implementation of the mechanism to reduce the charge to the bidders, i.e., use the value of k i to reduce the payment to bidder i. In fact, when all bidders bid simultaneously then k i = 0 for all i and OIM is simply the interval mechanism.
The way in which this optimization upon k i is done can arguably appear a bit complex but is not too hard to explain. First, when s ℓ−1 = s r+1 , then the facility will be placed in s ℓ−1 regardless of the location declared by i and by every other agent j queried after i. Hence, these agents will not have any incentive in declaring a position that is different from their real location even without payments.
As for the second and most important optimization step, we consider profiles x for which there are agents very far away from the facility. Indeed, as we will hint in Lemma 2, the facility is very likely to be included in the interval [L i , R i ]. Thus, if an agent i in x is very far away from this interval, one can slightly lower the payment assigned to her for every other profile and still have an OSP mechanism. Indeed, no such agent has an incentive to either move from another profile to x (obviously) nor to move from x to another profile x ′ (if the payment reduction is comparable with the distance between x i and x ′ i ). More details on the effectiveness of this optimization can be found in Lemma 9.
We highlight that this last optimization is particularly relevant when there is a location f such that when i declares f , then the facility will securely be located in f even if s ℓ−1 = s r+1 (this case corresponds to L i = R i = f ). In this case, it is possible to reduce the cost of every agent i in profile x from b − a to |x i − f |.
Nevertheless, we note that the mechanism still has very large costs, namely b − a, for at least n 2 − 1 agents. Indeed, for these agents, it turns out that L i = A i = a and R i = B i = b, and thus m i = b − a. We will show that this is inevitable with a direct-revelation mechanism.
We say that a profile
), i.e., x ′ j = x j for all the agents j ∈ K i . Before proving the properties of OIM, let us make some observations on L i and R i .
Lemma 2. For every i, and every
and there is one such profile for which f (x ′ ) = L i . Similarly, for every t < R i , f (x ′ ) ≤ R i for every i-compatible profile x ′ with x ′ i = t, and there is one such profile for which
Proof. Let t > L i and consider the profile x ′ such that
It is easy to see that
agents whose location is a. Hence, the leftmost median of x ′ must be a = L i . If ℓ ≥ 1, then L i is the ℓ-th smallest location among agents that are processed before i, and there are in x ′ exactly n−k i −1 agents whose location is surely not larger than L i . Then L i is the ℓ+n−k i −1 = n 2 -th smallest location in x ′ , i.e. the (leftmost) median.
On the other hand, it is immediate to see that there is no declaration by agents j / ∈ K i , with j = i, that can make the facility go to the left of L i . Let now t < R i and consider the profile x ′ such that
It is easy to see that f (x ′ ) = R i . Indeed, if r > k i , then in x ′ there are n − k i − 1 > n 2 agents whose location is b. Hence, the median of x ′ is b = R i . If r ≤ k i , then R i is the r-th smallest location among agents that are processed before i, and there is in x ′ exactly one agent whose location is smaller than R i . Then R i is the r + 1 = n 2 -th smallest location in x ′ , i.e. the (leftmost) median.
Moreover, as above, it is immediate to see that there is no declaration by agents j / ∈ K i , with j = i, that can make the facility go to the right of R i .
Lemma 3. For every i, and every
Proof. Let t ≤ L i and consider the profile x ′ such that
If ℓ ≥ 1, then L i is the ℓ-th smallest location among agents that are processed before i, and there are in x ′ exactly n − k i agents whose location is surely not larger than L i . Then L i is the ℓ + n − k i = n 2 + 1-th smallest location in x ′ . Thus, the leftmost median of x ′ will be s ℓ−1 if t ≤ s ℓ−1 and t otherwise. When ℓ < 1, then L i = a and clearly f (x ′ ) ≥ a.
If t ≥ R i , let us consider the profile x ′ such that
If r ≤ k i , then R i is the r-th smallest location among agents that are processed before i, and there is in x ′ no agent whose location is surely smaller than R i . Then R i is the r = n 2 − 1-th smallest location in x ′ . Thus, the leftmost median of x ′ will be s r+1 if t ≥ s r+1 and t otherwise. When r > k i , then R i = b and clearly f (x ′ ) ≤ b.
We first show that OIM is optimal and OSP with monitoring. Next we will prove that no direct-revelation mechanism enjoys the same properties with lower payments.
Theorem 6. OIM is an optimal mechanism that is OSP with monitoring.
Proof. We will next prove that the mechanism is OSP with monitoring, and thus for each agent it is obviously dominant to declare her real position. Since OIM places the facility on the median of these positions, it then turns out to be optimal as well.
Consider then agent i and let x i be her real position. If s ℓ−1 = s r+1 = λ, then the facility will be located in λ and i receives a zero payment, regardless of her declaration and the declarations of the agents not in K i . Suppose now that s ℓ−1 = s r+1 and the real position of i is
If i declares her real position, then her total cost will be at most m i . If i declares a different position
Suppose now that s ℓ−1 = s r+1 and the real position of i is x i = A i − c or x i = B i + c with c > 0. W.l.o.g. we will assume x i = A i − c. If i declares the real position, then her total cost will be at most m i + c. If i declares a position
where we used that, according to Lemma 3, f (x ′ ) ≥ x ′ i and thus d(
For every i-compatible profile x ′ such that f (x ′ ) < x ′ i , we have instead that
where we used that, according to Lemma 2, f (x ′ ) ≥ L i , and that A i > a, and therefore
Theorem 7. Every optimal OSP direct-revelation mechanism M = (f, p) either sets payments at least as high as OIM, or there is an agent i and a profile y such that p i (y) > 0.
Proof. Let M = (f, p) be an optimal OSP direct-revelation mechanism, and suppose that it assigns the lowest possible payments. Fix a player i and recall that K i is the set of agents whose location is known to i when she is queried. Clearly, no mechanism can set lower nonpositive payments than OIM when s ℓ−1 = s r+1 . Thus, we can safely consider that s ℓ−1 = s r+1 . Next lemmata show some conditions that payments must satisfy in order for M to be OSP and to minimize payments. Specifically, Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 focus on profiles x such that
Lemma 7 focuses on the remaining profiles. Suppose first that L i = R i . Then let µ i be the minimum cost that i pays in a profile x such that f (x) = x i (such a profile surely exists since, by optimality of M, i is not a dictator), i.e., µ i = min x : f (x) =x i c i (x i , M(x)). We begin by proving this useful claim. Claim 1. Let x be a profile such that f (x) = x i and c i (
Proof. Since M is a direct-revelation mechanism, then i diverges on y i and x i . Then, since M is OSP, it must be the case that
However, if f (y) = y i , then, by definition of µ i , it must be the case that c i (y i , M(y)) ≥ µ i , that leaves c i (y i , M(y)) = µ i as the only possible option.
Proof. Consider the following procedure:
1. Let w = 1, ∆ 0 = ∅, and y 0 be a profile achieving cost µ i .
Let
2 , consider the profile y w such that
and let ∆ w = [max{a, 2f (y w ) − t w }, t w ]. Otherwise consider y w such that
and let ∆ w = [t w , min{2f (y w ) − t w , b}].
] ⊆ ∆ w , set w = w + 1 and repeat from step 2.
Let us first prove, by induction, that for every w ≥ 0, it holds that c i (y w i , M(y w )) = µ i . This is clearly true for w = 0. Suppose now that c i (y
2 , then, according to Lemma 2, we have that f (y w ) = R i = y w i . Then, by Claim 1 applied with x = y w−1 , it holds that c i (y w i , M(y w )) = µ i . In fact, Claim 1 actually proves that for every w ≥ 0, and every y i ∈ ∆ w , it holds that c i (y i , M(y)) = µ i if f (y) = y i , and c i (y i , M(y)) ≤ µ i otherwise. Hence, we are only left to prove that there is a w such that
To this aim, we next we prove that for every w ≥ 1, the size of the range ∆ w is larger than the size of the range ∆ w−1 . This is clearly true for w = 1 since |∆ 0 | = 0 and f (y 1 ) = t 1 , from which we achieve that |∆ 1 | ≥ 2|f (y 1 )−t 1 | > 0. Consider, instead, w > 1. Suppose that ∆ w−1 = [max{a, 2f (y w−1 ) − t w−1 }, t w−1 ], from which we have that |∆ w−1 | ≥ 2t w−1 − 2f (y w−1 ). Note that this only occurs if t w−1 ≥
and thus f (y w−1 ) = L i , from which it follows that t w = 2f (y w−1 )
Hence, in both cases we achieve that
The case for ∆ w−1 = [t w−1 , min{b, 2f (y w−1 ) − t w−1 }] can be similarly proved. The lemma then follows since the above procedure eventually considers
Proof. Suppose that that there is an i-compatible profile y with f (y) = y i and c i (
Then, according to Lemma 2, there is a profile y ′ such that y ′ i = t and f (y ′ ) = y ′ i . Thus, by Lemma 4, it holds that c i (y ′ i , M(y ′ )) = µ i . However, since M is a direct-revelation mechanism, then i diverges on y i and y ′ i . Then, since M is OSP, it must be the case that
that is absurd.
Consider now the case that L i = R i . In this case we let µ i = min x : x i =L i c i (x i , M(x)). Next we prove a lower bound for µ i .
Lemma 6. Let y ′ be the i-compatible profile such that f (y ′ ) = y ′ i of minimum cost, i.e., Proof. Suppose that that there is an i-compatible profile y with y i = L i and c i (y i , M(y)) < c i (y ′ i , M(y ′ )) − d(y i , y ′ i ). Observe that, since L i = R i , it must be the case that f (y) = y i . Since M is a direct-revelation mechanism, then i diverges on y i and y ′ i . Then, since M is OSP, it must be the case that c i (y However, since M is a direct-revelation mechanism, then i diverges on y i and x i . Then, since M is OSP, it must be the case that c(y i , f (y)) ≤ c i (y i , M(x)) = max{d(y i , f (x)), d(x i , f (x))} − p i (x) = c + d(x i , f (x)) − p i (x) = c + µ i .
The case for y i = B i + c is similar.
These lemmata fix the payments for i-compatible profiles y such that y i ∈ [A i , B i ] when L i = R i . As for the remaining cases, next we show how to choose the minimum payments that enable the mechanism M to be optimal and OSP with monitoring. In particular, Lemma 8 focuses on profiles y such that y i = L i = R i . Lemma 9 focuses instead on profiles y with y i = A i − c or y i = B i + c. Proof. Consider M ′ = (f, p ′ ) as M except that it sets payments such that c ′ i (y i , M ′ (y)) = d(y i , f (y))−p ′ i (y) = c i (y ′ i , M(y ′ ))−d(y i , y ′ i ), and for every x ′ such that x ′ i = y i , it sets payments such that c ′ i (x ′ i , M ′ (x ′ )) − min x : x i =y i c ′ i (x i , M ′ (x)) = c i (x ′ i , M(x ′ )) − min x : x i =y i c i (x i , M(x)). Clearly, M ′ is a direct-revelation mechanism. Moreover, since it places the facility in the median location, it is optimal if it is OSP. Finally, M ′ reduces the payment assigned to i at least in the profile y.
Hence, it is only left to show that M ′ is OSP. Clearly, the OSP condition still holds between two profiles in which the location of i is different from y i , and when the real location of i is exactly y i . Next we show, that if the real location of i is x ′ i = y i , then it is not convenient for i to declare y i . That is, we prove that c ′ i (x ′ i , M ′ (x ′ )) ≤ c ′ i (x ′ i , M ′ (y)) for every x ′ . Since L i = R i , it must be the case that f (y) = y i = A i = B i , and then either x ′ i = A i − c or x ′ i = B i + c, with c > 0. According to Lemma 7, we have that
Theorem 7 does not rule out the existence of a non-direct-revelation mechanism that is OSP with lower payments. However, we next show that for every mechanism there is at least one instance on which it cannot set payments lower than the one assigned by OIM. In particular, it turns out that for every mechanism there is at least one instance on which at least n 2 − 1 agents incur in a very large cost, namely b − a.
how the ingredients needed for truthfulness with monitoring marry up the demands needed for OSP.
We leave open the problem of understanding the extent to which this parallel holds in general. Several additional open problems pertain the two case studies considered. For machine scheduling, it would be interesting to see whether the lower bound can be improved. For facility location, it is interesting to establish if indirect mechanisms can be more frugal for the agents. More generally, the mechanisms with monitoring for which we provide an OSP implementation are shown to be collusion-resistant; is there any way to guarantee OSP (with monitoring) without relying on coalitional notions of incentive-compatibility? And how hard is it to design OSP mechanisms that do not use any additional control on agents' declarations?
